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The American Bar Association's Model Business Corporation Act
(MBCA or Model Act) used to be a middle of the road statute. It was a
mid-America scheme,' offering more than a modicum of shareholder
protection. The MBCA's substantive prohibition of certain forms of
management conduct, with healthy reliance upon fiduciary duty as a
default device for policing corporate mismanagement, prevailed in
thirty-five United States jurisdictions. 2 Those included most non-com-
1. The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) first appeared in 1950, based upon
the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1935. See, e.g., Ray Garrett, History, Pur-
pose and Summary of the Model Business Corporation Act, 6 Bus. LAW. 1, at 1-2
(1950).
2. See, e.g., GEORGE SEWNARD & WILLIAM NAUSS, BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE § 2.01
at 32, n.10 (2d ed. 1977)(MBCA effective in 35 states). Idaho adopted the statute
in 1979, bringing the total to 36. See 1 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2.20, at 18 & n.40 (perm.
ed. rev. vol. 1990).
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mercial jurisdictions in which case law tended to be sparse.3
Since the 1983 publication of the Revised Model Business Corpora-
tion Act (RMBCA) exposure draft,4 the American Bar Association
(ABA) sponsored statute has swung dramatically to the right. Domi-
nated by large law firm lawyers, the ABA Committee on Corporate
Laws5 has chosen the pro corporate manager position at every junc-
ture. First, the wholesale revision, promulgated for adoption in 1984,
eliminated almost all substantive regulation of corporate manage-
ments' conduct, pleading fiduciary duty as the only effective regulator
of corporate actors.6 In subsequent 1980's enactments, the ABA com-
mittee began to gut fiduciary duty, first by enactment of conflict of
interest provisions that sought to deprive courts altogether of the
power to review director conflict of interest transactions. 7 Concomi-
3. The jurisdictions that had adopted the MBCA by 1960 were Maryland (in part),
Wisconsin, Oregon, Texas, District of Columbia, North Carolina (in part), Vir-
ginia, North Dakota, Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Connecticut (in part), and Alabama.
Chairman's Report to Members of the Section, 15 Bus. LAw. 247 (1960). In the
early and mid-1960s Arkansas, South Dakota and Washington followed, see
James F. Sporerri, Business Corporations--Statutory Developments in 1964 and
1965, 21 Bus. LAw. 1079 (1966), as did Utah, Wyoming, Mississippi, Nebraska,
South Carolina and Massachusetts. See 1 Fletcher, supra note 2, at 18. In the
later 1960s, New Mexico, Georgia, Montana, and Louisiana followed. Id. In the
1970s, Arizona, Idaho, New Jersey and Florida adopted the Model Act. Id. The
statutes of Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Vermont are
also substantial adoptions. Id.
4. In 1960, the MBCA Annotated appeared, published by the American Bar Founda-
tion in two volumes, following a revision process by the Committee on Corporate
Laws. The MBCA Annotated Second was published in 1971 and, as amended, is
the version currently in use in many states. MBCA Third, or the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act (Exposure Draft), was published for comment in 1983.
See, e.g., Elliott Goldstein & Robert W. Hamilton, The Revised Model Business
Corporation Act, 38 Bus. LAw. 1019 (1983). In 1984, the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act (RMBCA) was formally promulgated for adoption by the states.
See, e.g., 1 MODEL BusiNEss CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED xxiii (3rd ed. 1985).
The RMBCA is the work product of the exclusive 25 member Committee on Cor-
porate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association.
5. The Committee on Corporate Laws, its dominance by large law firm lawyers, and
its swerves to the right were criticized at an earlier time. See Melvin A. Eisen-
berg, The Model Business Corporation Act and the Model Business Corporation
Act Annotated, 29 Bus. LAW. 1407 (1974). The closed committee has membership
by invitation only, limited to 25 members. Within the ABA, the Committee is
unique in that it has authority to make final decisions without prior approval
from the Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law or the Association
Board of Governors. See Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 1455, 1459 (1985)("[C]orporate attorneys from large firms continue their
numerical dominance of the Committee on Corporate Laws membership.").
6. See generally Douglas M. Branson, Countertrends in Corporation Law: Model
Business Corporation Act Revision, British Company Law Reform, and Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REV. 53, 70-72 (1983).
7. See generally Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Cor-
[Vol. 72:258
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
tantly, following Delaware's lead, and stampeded by scare stories born
of the director and officer liability insurance crisis in 1986, most states
passed legislation permitting corporations to opt out of application of
the corporate law duty of care to their officers and directors, a devel-
opment the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws slavishly followed.8
More recently, the ABA committee fashioned a set of derivative action
proposals designed to eliminate almost all suits based upon the few
fiduciary duty causes of action that might remain under the typical
version of the ABA statute.9
This article's first purpose is to present this swerve right as stark
fact. The article then pauses to expand upon reasons for these devel-
opments-the transformation of the model statute into a big business
driven enactment, the obeisance to an academic law and economics
corporation law model based upon Fortune 500 rather than the small
and mid-size corporations the Model Act traditionally governs, and a
disingenuous effort by certain ABA committee members to use Model
Act changes to upstage, or "cut off at the pass," the American Law
Institute Corporate Governance Project's proposed more "liberal"
treatment of corporate law subjects.10
poration Act -Amendments Pertaining to Directors' Conflicting Interest Trans-
actions, 44 Bus. LAW. 1307 (1989)(promulgating for adoption by states proposed
Subchapter F to RMBCA Chapter 8, Directors and Officers).
8. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another CitadeL Attempts to Curtail the
Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Officers and Directors, 57
FORDHALi L. REv. 375, 380-82 (1988) (describing pattern of statutory adoptions of
or variations on Delaware General Corporation Law § 102(b)(7), permitting cor-
porations to limit or eliminate money damage liability for duty of care violations);
Dale A. Oesterle, The Fffect of Statutes Limiting Directors' Due Care Liability
on Hostile Takeover Defenses, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (1989)(similar). See
also Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Revised Model Business Cor-
poration Act-Amendment Pertaining to Liability of Directors, 46 Bus. LAw. 319
(1990)(notice of final adoption of opting out amendment to RMIBCA § 2.02(b);
Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Revised Model Business Corpora-
tion Act-Amendment Pertaining to the Liability of Directors, 45 Bus. LAw. 695
(1990)(text of amendment).
9. See generally Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Cor-
poration Act-Amendments Pertaining to Derivative Actions, 45 Bus. LAw. 1241
(1990)(promulgating proposed subchapter D to RMBCA Chapter 8, Directors and
Officers).
10. Commenced in the early 1980s, the American Law Institute (ALI) Corporate
Governance Project now consists of 11 tentative drafts and a proposed final draft.
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE (Proposed Fi-
nal Draft, March 31, 1992)(restating all Parts with amendments to date). The
genesis of the project is described in, inter alia, Roswell B. Perkins, The ALI
Corporate Governance Project in Midstream, 41 Bus. LAw. 1195 (1986). See also
Symposium on Corporate Governance, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 657-839 (1987); Sympo-
sium American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 495-871 (1984). The ALI Corporate Governance Project recommends an in-
dependent director board of directors and director committee structure and seeks
to codify corporations law that historically has been uncodified, namely, the law
1993]
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The analytical challenge this article presents itself is prediction of
corporate law's future. Entrusted with other people's money, some
corporate managers will self-deal or engage in questionable practices.
Shareholder plaintiffs will seek means to redress their grievances,
even if those shareholders must run the gauntlet statutory draftsmen
and corporate counsel have put in their way. Courts, too, will seek
routes around statutory obstacles when they suspect serious forms of
self-dealing or mismanagement. This article attempts to map some of
the common ground upon which courts and shareholder plaintiffs
might meet.'"
I. THE SWERVE TO THE RIGHT
A. The Vetting of Substantive Content from Corporate Statutes
Corporate law used to be constitutional law writ small. As consti-
pertaining to directors' and officers' fiduciary duties and to derivative actions.
The project has generated a welter of controversy, centered on the right and
captained by large law firm and in-house corporate counsel of Fortune 500 corpo-
rations. See, e.g., Edmund T. Pratt, The ALI Corporate Governance Project; A
Radical Cure for a Healthy Patient, (National Legal Center White Paper, March
1989)(Mr. Pratt was President of the Business Roundtable and Chief Executive
Officer, Pfizer, Inc.); Donald Seibert, The ALI and its "Litigation Model" of Cor-
porate Governance, (National Legal Center White Paper, April 1989)(Mr. Seibert
is the former chairperson of J. C. Penny Co., Inc.). Their visceral opposition is
mystifying, as a growing majority of their clients are Delaware corporations. See,
e.g., Emile Geylein & Richard Koenig, Pension Funds Plot Against Takeover
Law, WALL ST. J., April 5, 1989, at C1, col. 5 (stating that 56% of Fortune 500
firms are incorporated in Delaware). See also Roberta Romano, Law as a Prod-
uct. Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 225,
244 (1985)(81% of 515 surveyed firms that have reincorporated since 1960 have
done so in Delaware). Delaware corporate jurisprudence, of course, is well devel-
oped and will little be affected by what the ALI enacts.
11. Perhaps most valuable, however, is the description of the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act's course in the 1980s. Limited commentary exists. See, e.g., Rodman
Elfin, A Critique of Portions of the 1983 RMBCA, 28 ST. Louis U. L.J. 865 (1984);
sources cited supra notes 6 & 8. In academic spheres, it has become declasse to
endeavor anything other than application of the law and economics model to cor-
porate law subjects. See generally Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corpo-
rate Law, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1395-1774 (1989); Henry N. Butler & Larry E.
Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,
65 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1990). See also William W. Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts"
Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CoRNELL L. REv. 407 (1989). But see Victor
Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1403 (1985); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Contractarianism Without
Contracts: A Response to Professor McChesney, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1321 (1990);
Thomas L. Hazen, Corporate Directors'Accountability: The Race to the Bottom-
The Second Lap, 66 N.C. L. REV. 171 (1987); Robert B. Thompson, The Law's Lim-
its on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L. 377 (1990). No one has at-
tempted to describe just how far to the right changes in corporate law have taken
us, to the point at which, in the United States, we will soon no longer have main
stream, main street corporation law.
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tutions did for the branches of government, corporate laws provided a
form of organization, delineating the organs of a company-sharehold-
ers, board of directors, and officers-and assigning to those organs var-
ious powers and responsibilities. However, just as constitutions have
done, corporate laws went further, containing a number of substantive
do's and don'ts that acted as a check on majoritarian rule. The major-
ity shareholders, or their representatives, the directors and officers,
had power to conduct the corporation's business and affairs but, in so
doing, the law placed in their paths a number of limits or stops, be-
yond which they could not go.12
In the name of shareholder protection, corporate statutes con-
tained prohibitions of managerial actions that would result in dilution
of shareholders' ownership and voting interests. For example, if
shares had a par value, all shareholders had to pay par or better in
money or money's worth for their shares. 13 Even if an amount above
par is paid, equitable doctrines might intervene to insure that contem-
poraneously purchasing shareholders paid roughly the same amount
for shares.14 Because of susceptibility of abuse, certain forms of con-
sideration for shares were prohibited altogether.15 An entire edifice of
substantive prohibitions, called legal capital, developed to protect
shareholders from unwarranted dilution of their ownership interests.
On corporate law's governance side, another set of statutory com-
mands existed to protect shareholders from dilution. Among the pro-
12. So, too, did constitutions, or at least those on the American model, place limits on
how far the majority in a democracy, or, in a republican form of government,
their representatives, could go in certain directions. The British Constitution and
those based upon it, of course, contain no written limitations on how the majority,
or their elected representatives, may act. See, e.g., COLIN TURPIN, BRrrIsH Gov-
ERNmENT AND THE CONsTrrUTON (2d ed. 1990) at 23-28 (explaining supremacy of
Parliament) & at 122-23 (noting that lack of any written bill of rights serves as a
limit on the Parliament's sovereignty). Even in those countries with constitu-
tions based upon the British model, however, the trend has been to written bills
of rights as a check on raw majoritarian rule. See, e.g., Paul Bender, The Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the United States Bill of Rights: A Com-
parison, 28 McGiLL L.J. 811 (1983); Eric Cline & Michael J. Finley, Whither the
Implied Bill of Rights? (Canada), 45 SASK. L. REV. 137 (1981); Douglas A.
Schmeiser, The Entrenchment of a Bill of Rights (Canada), 19 ALBERTA L. REV.
375 (1981). See also Hilary Charlesworth, A Standard for Justice: A Critical Com-
mentary on the Proposed Bill of Rights for New Zealand, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 794
(1987)(book review); Jerome Elkind, The Optional Protoco" A Bill of Rights for
New Zealand, 1990 N.Z.L.J. 96; Sir Kenneth Keith, A Bill of Rights for New Zea-
land? Judicial Review Versus Democracy, 11 N.Z.U.L. REV. 307 (1985).
13. See, e.g., MBCA 2d § 18 (1960)("Shares having a par value may be issued for such
consideration expressed in dollars, not less than the par value thereof, as shall be
fixed from time to time by the board of directors.").
14. The leading cases are Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 132 A. 442 (Del. Ch. 1926),
and Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Hodgman, 13 F.2d 781 (3rd Cir. 1926).
15. See, e.g., MBCA 2d § 19 (1960)(exclusion of future services and promissory notes
as eligible consideration).
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tectors were preemptive rights doctrines and cumulative voting. The
former required that shareholders have a right of first refusal on any
new shares to be issued for cash, in order to preserve their proportion-
ate interests.16 The latter provided that minority shareholders could
obtain representation on the board of directors by voting the number
of shares owned times the number of directors to be elected for their
own minority candidate.17 Under earlier Model Act provisions, pre-
sumptively at least, any newly formed corporation had preemptive
rights and cumulative voting as part of its governance structure.18
Further provisions guarded against board packing or other nefari-
ous schemes. For example, directors appointed to newly created direc-
torships could serve only until the next shareholders' annual
meeting.19 They could not serve a full three year term that might ex-
ist in a corporation with staggered board of directors terms. Other
provisions required that certain meetings be held, that shareholders
have rights to air their views, and that shareholder approval be ob-
tained for certain transactions.20
Between the late 1970s and 1985 many of these provisions disap-
peared, largely under the leadership of the ABA Committee on Corpo-
rate Laws and yearly revisions to the MBCA, culminating in the
complete 1984 restatement in the RMBCA. In part the substantive
rules disappeared because clever lawyers could easily evade them. For
example, by setting par value very low the lawyer could enable the
client to evade the jumble of legal capital rules.21 Further, as they had
developed, the rules lacked logical consistency. The legal capital rules
alone and the intricacies connected with them were the bane of many
a law student's existence.2 2 So gone was par value, prohibition of
shares for future services, limits on loans of corporate funds to corpo-
16. See, e.g., Fuller v. Krogh, 113 N.W.2d 25 (Wisc. 1962)(describing preemptive
right). The preemptive right was a judicial creation, originating in Gray v. Port-
land Bank, 3 Mass. 364 (1807).
17. See, e.g., Bohannon v. Corp. Comm'n, 313 P.2d 379 (Ariz. 1957)(describing cumula-
tive voting and attempts to dilute its effect); Humphrys v. The Winous Co., 133
N.E.2d 780 (Ohio 1956)(same).
18. See MBCA § 24 (1950)(presumptive existence of preemptive rights unless limited
or denied by articles of incorporation); MBCA § 31 (1950) (mandatory cumulative
voting).
19. MBCA 2d § 38 (1971).
20. See MBCA 2d § 28 (1960)(describing annual and special meeting requirements on,
inter alia, call of ten percent or more of the shares); MBCA 2d § 59 (1960)(requir-
ing two-thirds vote to amend articles of incorporation); MBCA § 73 (1971)(same
for merger and mandatory share exchanges); MBCA § 79 (1960)(same for sale of
all or substantially all of a corporation's assets).
21. See, e.g., David R. Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in
the Organization of a Close Corporation, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1098, 1111 (1962).
22. One book, devoted exclusively to the arcane complexities of the subject, became a
law school bookstore best seller. See BAYLESS MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK
ON LEGAL CAPITAL (2d ed. 1981).
[Vol. 72:258
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rate officers and directors, presumptive preemptive rights, presump-
tive cumulative voting, and so on.23
In place of the old schemes, the Model Act offered no new scheme
of streamlined substantive command. Instead, Model Act corporate
law became a species of contract law. The statute's only function be-
came to provide an off the rack contract and form of organization that
the parties to a corporate venture could vary at their will. 2 4 The par-
ties to a corporate venture could "do their own thing."
B. The Rationale: Reliance On Fiduciary Duty
Further, the Model Act drafters told us, in the words of Spike Lee,
they would "do the right thing." This was because the only real pro-
tection that had existed all along was the omnipresent fiduciary duty.
With the client's cooperation, any lawyer could, for example, evade
the various discrete prohibitions of the legal capital or corporate gov-
ernance models if they thought out a sufficient plan. They might not
do so, however, because the well oiled shotgun behind the door was
fiduciary duty, always available to nip the clever scheme that would
harm minority shareholders or grant excessive license to those in con-
trol of the corporation.25
At numerous points the RMBCA "Official Comments," and the
statute itself, stated as a central reason for elimination of substantive
prohibitions that actions formerly prohibited remain subject to fiduci-
23. See RMBCA § 6.21(c)(determination of board of directors that consideration for
shares is adequate shall be "conclusive"); R2MBCA § 6.30(a)(no preemptive rights
except to the extent articles of incorporation so provide); RMBCA § 7.28(b) &
(d)(no right to cumulate votes for election of directors unless articles otherwise
provide and further restrictions on rights to cumulate even when specific provi-
sion has been made); RMBCA § 8.32 (withdrawn 1989)(specific authority for cor-
poration to loan funds to directors or to guarantee obligations of directors to third
parties). For an in-depth examination of one topic, abolition of restrictions on
loans to officers and directors, see Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Loans to Direc-
tors and Officers: Every Business Now a Bank?, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 237.
24. The Model Act facilitated the process as well. Quorums for shareholders' meet-
ings could be set low. See RMBCA § 7.25 (articles of incorporation can provide
otherwise with respect to quorums). In some instances, directors could amend
articles of incorporation without a shareholder plebiscite. See RMBCA § 10.02
(amendment of articles of incorporation by director action).
25. The cooperating client, in the person of assenting directors, could be held liable
for breach of fiduciary duty. The lawyer might also be held, for aiding and abet-
ting breach of fiduciary duty by others. See, e.g., Rowen v. Le Mars Ins. Co. of
Iowa, 282 N.W.2d 639, 654 (Iowa 1979)("all who assist or cooperate in the breach
of fiduciary duties-whether directors or not-are liable for the resulting dam-
age. This is particularly true of one who acted as attorney."). See also Mills Ac-
quisition Co. v. Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 n.33 (Del. 1989)("it is bedrock law
that the conduct of one who knowingly joins with a fiduciary, including corporate
officials, in breaching a fiduciary obligation, is equally culpable.")(emphasis ad-
ded)(referring to investment bankers).
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ary duty. Loans to corporate officers and directors, issuances of shares
for promissory notes or future services, directorial power unilaterally
to amend articles of incorporation in certain instances, and other en-
abling provisions introduced by the RMBCA, the reader was re-
minded, all remained subject to common law commands that directors
and officers act with due care, in good faith, and in the corporation's
best interests.26
A consequence of dependence on fiduciary duty is that dependence
leaves the aggrieved shareholder with no easy method of resolving
their grievance. Ex ante the presence of bright line statutory rules can
prevent a dispute from every arising. Ex post such a rule may enable
parties to resolve a dispute though negotiation. In litigation, a sub-
stantive rule may enable a shareholder plaintiff to resolve issues short
of trial, as on motion for summary judgment. These attributes of
bright line rules take on added importance with small and quasi-public
corporations. In that corporate arena, the traditional bailiwick of the
Model Act, the stakes may not be large enough to justify litigation.
Alternatively, shareholders and their counsel may not be sophisti-
cated enough to go beyond pointing to alleged violations of bright line
rules into the more subjective world of derivative actions and fiduciary
duties.
In a world ruled only by fiduciary duty, the issue of fairness-of
prices, or transaction terms, or method of dealing-is a question of fact
that comes to the fore.2 7 A plaintiff shareholder will have the burden
of proving that a transaction was unfair, or that directors lacked inde-
pendence, heavy burdens when the resources likely available to the
parties to the litigation are compared. The ascendancy of fiduciary
duty forecloses vindication of claims except when the shareholder's
stake is large or the shareholder's attorney can visualize recovery of
fees from a corporate treasury able to bear them.28
C. Gutting Fiduciary Duty: The Committee on Corporate Laws's
Subchapter F and Directors' "Conflicting Interest Transactions"
Oddly, though, this fear of fairness hearings and the spectre of go-
26. See, e.g., RMBCA §§ 302(12) comment, 6.21(b) comment, 10.01 comment. See also
RMBCA § 6.40 (fiduciary duty as a control on directors' revaluation of assets in
connection with distributions).
27. See generally Branson, supra note 6, at 70-71.
28. A shareholder plaintiff's attorney is entitled to fees from the corporate treasury
whenever the litigation has produced a substantial benefit-monetary or other-
wise-for the corporation. See, e.g., Berger v. Amana Soc'y, 135 N.W.2d 618 (Iowa
1965)(fees obtained after plaintiff had persuaded court to set aside amendment to
articles of incorporation); Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 101
N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 1960)(fees awarded after litigation produced nullification of
election of directors). See generally HARRY G. HENN & JOHN ALEXANDER, LAwS
OF CORPORATIONS § 377, at 1107-14 (3rd ed. 1983).
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ing to trial motivated would-be defendants, rather than the share-
holder class. Corporate lawyers lamented the state of the law. Even
though their clients, corporate managers, were far less likely to trip
over some obscure substantive rule, corporate lawyers viewed the cup
as half empty rather than half full. Proving fairness, even if only
rarely, would necessitate costly, complex trials, with attendant risks of
losing in some of them.29
1. Origin of Fairness as the Talisman
Paradoxically, corporate lawyers first made fairness the touch-
stone. Under common law, conflict of interest transactions were void-
able unless, based upon full disclosure of the transaction's terms and
the interested director's likely benefit from it, disinterested directors
approved the transaction and, objectively, had been reasonable in so
doing.30 The latter element was supplied by a requirement that the
transaction approved had been fair to the corporation.3 '
Beginning with a 1933 California enactment, duty of loyalty stat-
utes cut the three pronged common law test in two, making it disjunc-
tive rather than conjunctive. 32 A conflict of interest transaction could
be sanitized upon either disclosure and a disinterested director vote or
a subsequent showing of fairness.
Most such conflict of interest statutes purport to be authoritative.33
They provide flatly that a transaction is not voidable if, based upon
full disclosure, disinterested directors had approved it. On their face,
29. See, e.g., Charles Hansen, John F. Johnston & Fredrick H. Alexander, The Role of
Disinterested Directors in "Conflict" Transactions: The ALr Corporate Govern-
ance Project and Existing Law, 45 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2090-97 (1990)(claiming that
courts should not and cannot engage in review of transactions directors have ap-
proved). See also Richard W. Dusenberg, The Business Judgement Rule and
Shareholder Derivative Suits: A View from the Inside, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 311, 325-
330 (1983); Dennis Honnabach & Roger Dennis, The Seventh Circuit and the Mar-
ketfor Corporate Control, 65 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 681, 686-89 & 711 (1989)(lament-
ing liberation "of the fiduciary genie from her bottle," with attendant risk of a
fairness hearing).
30. See Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 39-40 (1966). See also Ahmend Bulbulia & Arthur R.
Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering
Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW REV. 201 (1977).
31. See, e.g., Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378, at
380 (1918)('There must be candor and equity in the [interested director] transac-
tion and some reasonable proportion between benefits and burdens.").
32. See Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 30, at 206, n.41.
33. The effect of statutory compliance may vary. Under several of the statutes, com-
pliance with the statutory burden shifts to the complaining shareholder the bur-
den of proving the transaction unfair. Conversely, if no disclosure and vote had
occurred, the interested director, and usually the corporation as his ally, have the
burden of proving fairness. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(3)(West 1990);
S.H.A. 805 ILCS 5/8.60 (West 1993).
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then, statutes seem completely to immunize a transaction that direc-
tors have approved, no matter how outlandish or injurious to the cor-
poration the transaction might be.
In Fliegler v. Lawrence,3 4 the Supreme Court of Delaware held
such a literal reading of these conflict of interest statutes to be unrea-
sonable. The court stated that "[Delaware General Corporation Law
section 144] merely removes an 'interested director' cloud when its
terms are met and provides against invalidation of an agreement
'solely' because such a director or officer is involved. Nothing in the
statute sanctions unfairness to [the corporation] or removes the trans-
action from judicial scrutiny."3s The fiduciary duty of loyalty will not
necessarily be satisfied by compliance with statutory procedures.36
2. Rationale for "Reform"
The remote possibility of judicial scrutiny of transactions, despite a
corporate lawyer's best efforts to comply with statutory procedures,
offended corporate lawyer's quest for certainty. Despite the paucity of
cases, 37 this possibility and the corporate lawyer predilection for dot-
ting every "i" and crossing every "t" prompted the ABA Committee
on Corporate Laws to act.38 In 1988-89, the committee replaced the
simple one section interested director provision the RMBCA con-
tained when it appeared in 1984.39
3. Model Act Chapter 8, Subchapter F-Gutting the Duty of
Loyalty
The ABA committee promulgated a laborious set of four statutory
provisions 40 designed to eliminate even the possibility of fairness re-
34. 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
35. Id. at 222.
36. Earlier a California appellate court had reached a similar conclusion. Remillard
Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
37. The possibility of a fairness review is remote. The cases in which courts have
actually proceeded to a fairness hearing after directors had complied with statu-
tory procedures are few, with the reported cases almost non-existent. They in-
clude Remillard Brick, 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952), and Fliegler v.
Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976). Even Fliegler ultimately found fairness, or
enough earmarks of fairness, including a shareholder vote, that the court left the
challenged transaction undisturbed. 361 A.2d at 224-25. Courts give wide latitude
to findings made by capable business persons acting in apparent good faith.
38. "In the real business world, a decision must be made now whether or not to pro-
ceed with the transaction and legal counsel's opinion must be delivered now as to
whether clearance procedures are available and have been complied with." Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws, supra note 7, at 1309 (1989).
39. RMBCA § 8.31 (withdrawn 1989).
40. RMBCA §§ 8.60-8.63. These prolix provisions, as well as the similar eight section
Model Act subchapter proposed for derivative actions, see infra notes 71-75 &
accompanying text, form examples of what Dean Calabresi has lamented as the
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views liegler and traditional interested director statutes present.4 ' If
full disclosure has been made and disinterested directors have ap-
proved the transaction, their complex statutory provisions preclude
any judicial review of the transaction whatsoever.42
The ABA statute, however, is more objectionable. As a matter of
legislative enactment, the provisions define narrowly "director con-
flicting interest transactions" that must be submitted to disinterested
director approval procedures in the first place.43 Transactions that
common sense dictates involve strong possibility of conflict are de-
fined as a matter of law not to be conflict of interest transactions. For
example, an exposure draft defined transactions with a director's
brother-in-law, or an entity controlled by him, as not involving a con-
flict of interest, as a matter of law.44 Because that hypothetical in
commentary was felt to be too raw, committee drafters modified the
"statutorification of American Law." GuiDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR
THE AGE OF STATUTES at 1 (1982).
41. The relief valve of judicial scrutiny even in a few cases was intolerable to the
ABA committee. See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 7, at 1309
("[E]xisting case law governing interest conflicts of directors is in a state of un-
healthy uncertainty, reflecting differing judicial attitudes ...." and "[E]conomic
efficiency, predictability, and business finality... are also at stake and should be
accorded heavy countering weight in the law.").
42. RMBCA § 8.61(b) provides that:
A director's conflicting interest transaction may not be enjoined, set
aside, or give rise to an award of damages or other sanctions, in a pro-
ceeding by a shareholder or by or in the right of the corporation, because
the director, or any person with whom or which he has a personal, eco-
nomic, or other association, has an interest in the transaction, if:
(1) directors' action respecting the transaction was at any time taken
in compliance with [limited disclosure and directorial voting procedures];
(2) shareholders' action respecting the transaction was at any time
taken... ;
(3) the transaction, judged according to the circumstances at the time
of commitment, is established to have been fair to the corporation.
43. The interest of the director or a "related person" of a director must be a "finan-
cial interest" that is "of such financial significance to the director or a related
person that the interest would reasonably be expected to exert an influence on
the director's judgement ...." RMBCA § 8.60(1)(i). By definition, familial or
social relationships alone cannot give rise to a conflict of interest. Moreover, the
definition of "related person" is a narrow one. See discussion infra notes 44-45.
44. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation
Act-Amendments Pertaining to Director's Conflicting Interest Transactions, 43
Bus. LAw. 691, Comment to § 8.61, at 705 (1988):
If a plaintiff charges that a director had a conflict of interest with respect
to a transaction of the corporation because the other party was his
brother-in-law, the answer of the court should be: "No. A brother-in-
law, as such and without more, is not included in section 8.60(3) as a
related person and under section 8.61(a), I have no authority to reach out
farther." If a plaintiff contends that the director had a conflict of inter-
est in a corporate transaction because the other party is president of the
golf club the director wants desperately to join, the court should re-
spond: "No. The only director's conflicting interest on the basis of which
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statutory definitions to set the boundary at transactions by a corpora-
tion with a director's first cousins.45 This kind of sleight of hand
makes a mockery of fiduciary duty, constituting a wholesale negation
of a large portion of the common law. Moreover, the ABA Committee
actions become duplicitous when the 1988-89 enactment is held up
against the backdrop of repeated invocation of fiduciary duty as the
policy reason for eliminating substantive content from the Model Act
in 1983-84.
D. Demise of the Duty of Care
In 1985, the Supreme Court of Delaware handed down its decision
in Smith v. Van Gorkom.46 While announcing a gross negligence stan-
dard to determine if directors had been diligent enough to enter the
business judgment rule safe harbor,47 the court held liable the direc-
tors of a publicly held corporation for what at most was ordinary negli-
gence. The directors had followed the corporation's chief executive
officer and his recommendation to accept a cash offer for the corpora-
tion, based upon only two hours' discussion at a single board meeting,
with benefit neither of an independent appraisal nor review of any
documents.
Swirling around Smith v. Van Gorkom in 1985 was a rapid escala-
tion in premiums for director and officer liability insurance. A crisis
atmosphere prevailed in boardrooms and in large law firm corporate
practitioners' offices.48 Of course, the crisis was as much an outgrowth
I can set aside a corporate transaction... is a financial interest as defined
in section 8.60."
45. The statutory definition states that " 'Related person' of a director means... the
spouse (or a parent or sibling thereof) of the director, or a child, grandchild, sib-
ling, parent (or spouse of any thereof) of the director .... RMBCA § 8.60(3). As
amended the definition takes up the brother-in-law. The new margin, and source
of jokes on the Committee on Corporate Laws, became transactions with a direc-
tor's first cousin or an entity controlled by him.
In commentary, the hypothetical used is a transaction with a corporation of
which a participating director is a creditor, an obvious conflict of interest as the
director will wish to see that his debtor obtains the benefit of the new business or
transaction. See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 7, at 1316 ("[I]f... a
court is presented with the argument that D, a director of X Co., is also a major
creditor of Y Co. and that stake in Y Co. gives D a conflicting interest, the court
should reply that D's creditor interest does not fit any subcategory of subdivision
(1)(ii) or subdivision (3) and therefore the conflict of interest claim must be re-
jected .... ").
46. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
47. Id. at 873.
48. See, e.g., Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom" The Business of Judging
Business Judgement, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187, 1189 (1986)(decision rests on "wide-
spread fallacy" and threatens to "undermine the entire business judgement
rule.").
[Vol. 72:258
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
of litigation generated by the 1980's takeover boom as it was due to any
defect in the common law's duty of care.
In June 1986 the Delaware Legislature played a trump card, effec-
tively overruling Smith v. Van Gorkom and the common law. In new
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, the legis-
lature provided that Delaware corporations could amend articles of
incorporation to modify or eliminate altogether money damage liabil-
ity for directorial violations of their duty of care.49 Beginning in the
summer of 1986, copycat enactments swept the country. In the 1986-87
legislative seasons, forty or more United States jurisdictions enacted
"opt out" statutes inspired by Delaware's June 1986 enactment.50 The
Committee on Corporate Laws followed with its own version of an opt
out statute.5 1 Thus, in response to a temporary problem, a liability
insurance crunch that had affected most forms of liability insurance,
and not D & 0 coverage alone,5 2 most American legislatures let them-
selves be goaded into adopting a permanent change to bedrock com-
mon law.
In the jurisdictions adapting "opt out" provisions, bar association
committees and other drafters did not limit this legislative solution to
publicly held corporations in which the problem was said to exist and
in which qualified independent directors were increasingly difficult to
recruit. Any corporation could opt out of duty of care liability. As
word processors spin out standard form articles of incorporation, in
the 1990s and beyond, nascent corporations, small as well as large, will
have been born without a true duty of care policing directors' actions.
In 1984, the ABA Committee had repeatedly relied upon common
law fiduciary duty's abiding strength as a key ground for elimination
of most substantive content from the RIBCA. By 1986-87, the com-
mon law duty of care was disappearing. By 1988, the ABA Committee
on Corporate Laws had pushed through their scheme to render nuga-
tory the common law duty of loyalty. The only real protection, fiduci-
49. Delaware amended its general corporation law, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7)(1991), to provide that an optional provision in articles of incorporation
could limit or exclude directors' liability for any breach of the duty of care,
provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a
director- (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corpo-
ration or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; ...
or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit.
50. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 8, at 380-81; Oesterle, supra note 8, at 31.
51. See note 8 supra.
52. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insur-
ance Crises, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1158-59 (1990)(directors' and officers' liability
insurance caused by severe tightening of reinsurance market generally); Roberta
Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors' and Officers'Liability Insurance?,
14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 18-21 (1989)(same).
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ary duty, had become a piece of Swiss cheese. But ever cautious,
plugging every leak, the ABA Committee determined that its work
was not done.
E. The Ultimate Death of the Derivative Action: The Committee on
Corporate Laws Universal Demand Requirement
1. The Advent of the Special Litigation Committee Device
In 1980, Professor George Dent published a widely cited article en-
titled The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation:
The Death of the Derivative Suit?3 Professor Dent's piece was moti-
vated by developments in 1979. Within weeks of one another, the
United States Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals had
decided Burks v. Lasker5 4 and Auerbach v. Bennett.5 5 These cases re-
vived a few older precedents5 6 which intimated that, based upon a
committee of independent directors' determination that a share-
holder's suit was not in the corporation's best interests, a court could
dismiss a derivative suit. That was so even though the court believed
that wrongdoing directors had violated fiduciary duties or that their
actions had harmed the corporation. Just as natural persons can, cor-
porations should be able to elect not to stand on legal rights they may
have. The problem was how corporations could find their voice for
making those determinations.57
The answer was the special litigation committee (SLC) of in-
dependent directors. If the committee had sufficient independence
from the alleged wrongdoers, and had been duly diligent in its investi-
gation of the shareholder's allegations, the committee's recommenda-
tion was within the province of the business judgment rule. The court
must accept the committee's findings and dismiss the suit.
Despite SLCs and their power over dismissal, derivative actions
continued to be filed, fueled by America's growing litigiousness, large
stakes generated by the takeover boom, and other factors, such as the
wide availability of attorneys' fees for shareholder plaintiffs' lawyers.
Moreover, later decisions took back some of the primacy earlier deci-
sions had granted SLCs.
53. 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 96.
54. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
55. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S. 2d 920 (1979).
56. The first case of the modern era was Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), but in Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), the Supreme Court
relied upon a handful, or less, of older state law precedents. Id at 487 (concurring
opinion of Stewart, J.), citing McKee v. Rogers, 156 A. 191 (Del. Ch. 1931), Rice v.
Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 130 N.E.2d 442 (Ohio Common Pleas 1954), and
Goodwin v. Castleton, 144 P.2d 725 (Wash. 1944).
57. See generally James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative
Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALl Project, 1982 DuKE L.J. 959.
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2. Zapata and a Partial Retreat by State Supreme Courts
Aside from Auerbach v. Bennett, a New York Court of Appeals de-
cision, most of the early SLC cases by happenstance had been decided
by federal courts,5 8 making educated Erie guesses about what state
law might provide.59 However, when the Supreme Court of Delaware
first confronted a special litigation committee case, that court did not
confine the trial judge to review of the committee's independence and
diligence.60 In its discretion, the trial court could take the so-called
Zapata "seconid step." The court could review on the merits plaintiff's
allegations and the committee's analysis of them. In select cases, the
court could overrule the litigation committee, permitting plaintiff to
proceed to trial.
Although the cases are not plentiful, all the subsequent determina-
tions by state appellate courts have followed Delaware. Courts in
Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Iowa have endorsed the Zapata
"second step."6 ' Despite Professor Dent's lament, the derivative ac-
tion had not died. But, of course, the America Bar Association's Com-
mittee of Corporate Laws had not yet attempted to kill it.
3. The True Death Knell for the Derivative Action-Background
of the Committee on Corporate Laws' Subchapter D
The Reporters for the American Law Institute Corporate Govern-
ance Project pointed the way for the ABA. As a matter of common
law of corporations, derivative action law provides that shareholders
who would be plaintiffs must first make demand upon the board of
directors to act.62 Only if the directors take no action, or a threat of
58. See, eg., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 449 U.S. 869
(1980); Cramer v. Gen. Tel. & Electronics Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich.
1980).
59. Although mentioned by codes of civil procedure, see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1, the
demand requirement allocates power among the organs of a corporation and is
therefore a matter of substantive corporation law. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin.
Serv., Inc., Ill S. Ct. 1711 (1991). Hence, in a diversity case or exercising pendant
jurisdiction, a federal court must make an educated guess concerning state law
governing the demand requirement.
60. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
61. See, ag., Miller v. Register and Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa
1983)(holding that if majority of directors are implicated, board has no power to
appoint special litigation committee); Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323 (N.C.
1987)(holding Zapata applicable in both demand excused and demand refused
cases); Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51 (Mass. 1990)(expressly following Zapata and
ALI approach).
62. See, e-g., the routine application of the principle in Karris v. Water Tower Trust &
Sav. Bank, 389 N.E.2d 1359, 1367 (Il. App. 1979)("It has long been held that, as a
prerequisite to a derivative action against a corporate officer or director, a minor-
ity shareholder must show either that he made a demand upon the corporation to
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irreparable harm to the corporation exists, can the shareholder pro-
ceed to court.63 If the directors do act, they can either accept the suit
and proceed or they can "refuse" the demand. Shareholder plaintiffs
view both outcomes as undesirable. They view "demand accepted" un-
desirable because of the suspicion that a sweetheart settlement will
quickly be reached between corporation and alleged wrongdoer.64
They view "demand refused" undesirable because under the leading
law on the subject, that of Delaware, a special litigation committee
recommendation at the demand stage is not reviewable in the same
manner as is a recommendation to dismiss after a shareholder plaintiff
has commenced litigation.65
Hence, shareholder plaintiffs attempt to circumvent demand, pro-
ceeding directly to court under a third common law branch, demand
excused. The principal sub-branch of demand excused is futility.
Plaintiff alleges that a demand would not receive fair treatment be-
cause a majority of the directors either are implicated in the wrongdo-
ing or are dominated by the wrongdoing directors.66
enforce the corporate right and that such demand was refused, or that a demand
would have been futile."). Delaware has a long line of cases to the same effect.
See, e.g., Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1166 (Del.
1989)("These requirements are more than mere formalities of litigation but stric-
tures of substantive law."); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984)(same); Ar-
onson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)(same).
63. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 7.03(b)(Tenative Draft No. 6, 1986) (irreparable injury exception codified).
64. In case of acceptance of demand, the corporation should realign itself as plaintiff
and the original plaintiff's participation in the case ceases. See, e.g., Powell v.
Western Illinois Elec. Co-op., 536 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Ill. App. 1989)(original plaintiff
not even entitled to hearing on question of realignment of parties). Furthermore,
although FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 and state law equivalents require court approval of a
settlement between plaintiff shareholder and the corporation, those rules do not
require judicial approval of settlements the corporation reaches with the other
"true" defendants. See Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.)(Friendly, J.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965). Although they are thus not required to do so, corpo-
rations often do proffer such settlements for judicial approval in order to obtain
issue preclusion against other shareholders. Derivative actions ending in judicial
resolution preclude other actions predicated on the same alleged wrongs. See,
e.g., Parkoff v. Gen. Tel. & Electronics Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 412, 425 N.E.2d 820, 442
N.Y.S.2d 432 (1981)(holding no res judicata in the case at bar).
65. That is, there is no Zapata second step in demand refused, as opposed to demand
excused, cases. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 1990); Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981). See generally Michael P. Dooley & E.
Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware and
the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAw. 503, 506-07 & 523 (1989).
66. See, e.g., Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3rd Cir.), cert denied, 103 Sup. Ct. 176
(1982); Bergstein v. Texas Int'l Co., 453 A.2d 467, 470-71 (Del. Ch. 1982); Vander-
bilt v. Geo-Energy Ltd., 590 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1984). Other sub-branches of
the demand excused branch involve threats of irreparable harm to the corpora-
tion, see supra note 63, inordinate delay or failure to respond to the demand, see
Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1113 (D. Del. 1985)(four
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One difficulty of the common law demand futility exception is that
it necessitates a mini-trial of sorts on issues of director wrongdoing or
dominance before the court can stamp the case as demand excused.6 7
To avoid trial within trial, and in the name of logical consistency, the
ALI Reporters proposed universal demand.68 The common law futil-
ity exception would no longer exist. Another result would be in every
case to move the special litigation committee evolution up to an earlier
chronological point. In every case, plaintiffs make demand. Corpora-
tions respond with the SLC. Resort to court action would come only
with an unsatisfactory extrajudicial resolution for plaintiffs.
If a plaintiff were dissatisfied, she could urge the court to examine
the committee's disinterestedness and diligence. Under the ALI sche-
matic, as originally proposed, and unlike Delaware's present law, how-
ever, the court also could take the Zapata "second step" in demand
refused cases.69 Though the ALI would eliminate demand futility and
move special litigation committee deliberations to an earlier temporal
stage, under the ALI schematic, in its discretion a court could under-
take a substantive review of plaintiff's allegations and the committee's
response to them. That relief valve of possible judicial review would
counterbalance the prejudice to shareholders a universal demand re-
quirement introduces.70
4. Gutting the Derivative Action-The Committee on Corporate
Laws at Work
The ABA Committee on Corporate Laws has copycatted the ALI
universal demand rule. Their proposed replacement provisions 7 ' for
the single derivative action section 72 in the original RMBCA has as its
month delay not sufficient), and the refusal of the corporation to take a position
one way or another, see Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726,
731 (Del. 1988).
67. See, e.g., Easterbrook, J., in Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Services, Inc., 908 F.2d 1338,
1343 (7th Cir. 1990), reversed, 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991)(adopting universal demand as
matter of federal common law). See also Easterbrook, J., concurring in Starrels
v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1173 (7th Cir. 1989)("as a way to
curtail litigation, the demand rule is a flop.").
68. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 63, at § 7.03(a)("Exhaustion of Intracorporate Remedies").
69. See id. at § 7.08 ("Termination of Actions ... Based Upon a Recommendation of
the Board or a Committee); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.11 (Tenative Draft No. 9, 1989) ("Judicial Procedures
on a Motion for Termination of a Derivative Action.").
70. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Services, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1720 (1991)("Superim-
posing a rule of universal-demand over the [common law] corporate doctrine of
[demand futility] would clearly upset the balance that [the States] have struck
between the power of the individual shareholder and the power of the directors
to control corporate litigation.").
71. RMBCA §§ 7.40-7.47, reprinted in 45 Bus. LAW. 1241 (1990).
72. RMBCA § 7.40 (withdrawn May, 1990).
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linchpin ALI-like demand universality. 73 However, the ABA drafters
turn it on its head. They provide that there can be no review, that is,
no Zapata "second step," of a demand refused determination made by
independent directors.74
This would signal true death for derivative litigation. The craft of
derivative action practice is such that corporate counsel will know to
supplement the board with additional directors who, since they had no
connection with the corporation at the time of wrongdoing, are argua-
bly "independent." Perhaps assisted by independent counsel, those di-
rectors will investigate the allegations of wrongdoing. Inevitably, they
will arrive at a recommendation that the corporation refuse the
demand.75
If plaintiff persists and files a complaint in court, the corporation
will move to dismiss, filing the director committee's report. The
RMBCA provisions permit the court only to examine the indepen-
dence of the directors staffing the committee and their diligence. If
corporate counsel script it right, no derivative claim will ever see full
light of day.
73. See RMBCA § 7.42: "No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until
(1) a written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action;
and (2) 90 days have expired ......
74. See RMBCA § 7.44 (a): "A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court
on motion by the corporation if one of the groups specified in subsections (b) or
(f) has determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon
which its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding
is not in the best interests of the corporation." Subsection (b) provides for recom-
mendations by either a majority vote of independent directors or by a committee
of two or more independent directors. Subsection (f) provides for recommenda-
tions by court appointed panels of independent persons, presumably in cases in
which all the directors are implicated in the wrongdoing. Commentary makes
clear that the Committee on Corporate Laws consciously declined to adopt the
more liberal position of cases such as Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 327 (N.C.
1987) (discretionary judicial review of recommendations on the merits in both de-
mand refused and demand excused cases), or Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779 (Del. 1981)(review in some cases). See Official Comment to RMBCA
§ 7.44, supra note 9, at 1246, 1251.
75. In Alford v. Shaw, 324 S.E.2d 878, 886 (N.C. App. 1985), the court found troubling
that in reported demand excused cases "[N]ot one committee, in all these in-
stances, has decided to proceed with suit." Cf. supra, note 63, Reporters' Note 3 to
§ 7.08, at 138 (in two cases committees did recommend that suits go forward
"against some, but not all," defendant former employees). One experienced
member of the plaintiffs' derivative action bar reports that his count is 97-0 on
reported cases of directorial recommendations to dismiss cases against other di-
rectors. Conference telephone conversation between members of the Washing-
ton State Bar Association Corporate Law Revision Committee and William
Lerach, Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Specthrie & Lerach, New York, New York, July
26, 1991 (notes on file with the author).
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5. The Outcome-An Absence of Signifcant Legal Control Over
Corporate Managers' Conduct in Model Act
Jurisdictions
However, universal demand with only a business judgment stan-
dard of judicial review, that is, no Zapata "second step," is only a fail-
safe system. It cuts off derivative proceedings in the few cases in
which, at an earlier point, counsel had not utilized the Subchapter F
powers to sanitize interested director transactions, or had not had the
corporation amend articles of incorporation to opt out of duty of care
liability. Viewed in that light, at a minimum, the RMBCA derivative
action procedures are overkill.
All of this statutory drafting places great weight on "independent"
directors acting in a disinterested fashion. However, their numbers
are dominant only at the level of publicly held, or large publicly held,
corporations. At that level, independent directors are chief executive
officers of other large corporations or persons of means and influence.
They are not about to compromise their integrity, or automatically do
management's bidding, tacit or otherwise. The Model Act, however,
has the most influence in non-commercial jurisdictions.76 In those ju-
risdictions, the Model Act is the governing statute for small and mid-
dle size non-public or quasi public corporations.7 7 At that level,
director independence is a matter of shades of gray.78 Cronyism, nepo-
tism, spite, and slight are a few of the factors that creep in to make
truly independent directors, as well as a litigation model based upon
their prevalence, doubtful propositions. In that sphere as well, neither
media attention nor any semblance of a Delaware-like plaintiffs' bar
serves to monitor director activity.79
76. See, e.g., the listing of jurisdictions in note 3 supra.
77. The quasi-public corporation has been defined as one with from 10 to 1000 share-
holders. See Alfred F. Conard, The Corporate Census: A Preliminary Explora-
tion, 63 CAL. L. REv. 440, 456-60 (1975)(1970 estimate was that together with
closely held corporations they made up 99.8 percent of all incorporated entities in
the United States). Together with closely held corporations, they make up more
than 99 percent of the corporations domiciled in a representative Model Act juris-
diction. See Clarence W. Walker, Should Corporate Statutes Providing Special
Protection for Directors Be Limited to Publicly Traded Corporations?, 24 WAKE
FoREsT L. REV. 79, 80-81 (1989)(census of North Carolina corporations).
78. Furthermore, the Model Act version of independent director is even less likely to
be truly independent in many cases, for RMBCA § 7.44(c)(1) provides without
limitation that directors who are defendants can still participate in "the nomina-
tion or election" of new directors to staff a litigation or similar committee. See
also Official Comment to RMBCA § 7.44, supra note 9, at 1249 ("[P]articipation of
non-independent directors or shareholders in the nomination or election of a new
director shall not prevent the new director from being considered independent.")
79. A Committee on Corporate Laws member would argue that a Zapata second step
puts judges in the midst of analyzing complex business transactions. However,
judges know this. They are unlikely to apply anything more than an olfactory
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II. REASONS WHY: MOTIVATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CORPORATE LAWS
A. Too Many Rose Colored Glasses
The large law firm corporate bar is, as one observer said of the
Delaware corporate establishment, "[1]ike a genteel men's club, where
no one would ever dream of casting aspersions on the motives of any-
one else, where the general goodness and high-mindedness of every
member is taken for granted."8 0 By contrast, Mr. Justice Holmes ad-
monished those who would evaluate a legal rule: "[Y]ou must look at it
as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences... knowl-
edge enables him to predict" and "not as a good one, who finds his
reasons for conduct ... in the vaguer sanctions of conscience."8s
Committee on Corporate Laws members function in a world in
which directors are independent. In their world no one would dream
of disguising a beholden director as an independent one. Faced with a
choice between higher conduct standards or flexible enabling guide-
lines, committee members glance at the former but adopt the latter.
They do so not out of ulterior motive, but because based upon their
own experiences they believe the corporate bar and corporate manage-
ments to be comprised of persons of rectitude who would not permit
the statutory procedures for sanitizing conflicts of interest or dis-
missing derivative suits to be used for mean or sharp dealing. Coinci-
dentally, those procedures make easier counsel's task in advising
management about how to proceed.
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws members fail to heed Holmes'
admonition.8 2 In corporate management and among the corporate
bar, as one moves away from large publicly held corporations and big
city large law firms, there exist lawyers and corporate managers with
only a modicum, or less, of integrity. There are those whom the
"vaguer sanctions of conscience" do not affect. They will utilize these
procedural pathways the Committee has set in place for nefarious
ends.
standard of review to either the underlying transaction or the recommendation to
dismiss.
80. Joseph Nocera, Delaware Puts Out, ESQUIRE, Feb. 1990, at 47, 48.
81. OLIVER W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 171
(1920).
82. Anecdotally, when a member raised questions along bad man lines, the Commit-
tee side stepped those objections. An academic member not of the law and eco-
nomics school objected to the proposed conflict of interest provisions. Committee
powers merely delayed final approval until the remaining year of her four year
term had expired.
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B. Utilization of a Fortune 500 Corporate Model Not Suited for Model
Act Jurisdictions
Comments on independent directors and their dearth on the plane
on which the Model Act operates illustrate that Committee on Corpo-
rate Laws has used the wrong model. It has built a statutory appara-
tus dependent on independent directors likely to be prevalent only on
the Fortune 500 level.83
Developments at the theoretical level parallel the MBCA's evolu-
tion. Under a law and economics view, market forces govern corpo-
rate managers more effectively than discrete substantive rules of law
or fiduciary duties or lawsuits ever could. That may be true but, again,
only at the Fortune 500 level. In ways not even partially articulated,
the law and economics movement's contributions to corporate law
have been a major factor in the Committee on Corporate Laws' effec-
tive abandonment of substantive command, fiduciary duty, and deriva-
tive actions.8 4 Over-reliance on independent directors is a direct
reliance on Fortune 500 corporations and large law firm experience.
Reliance on the theoretical law and economics model is misplaced reli-
ance on the same large, publicly held corporation paradigm.
C. Influence of the Law and Economics Branch of the Corporate Law
Academy
During the 1980s, law and economics preempted the field of aca-
demic corporate law.85 Other points of view simply did not find ex-
83. This selection of an inappropriate model has been endemic in Committee on Cor-
porate Laws efforts for many years. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 5, at 1465-66:
My most serious personal criticism of the Committee consensus is that,
even though the Act will be applicable primarily to corporations not reg-
istered under the federal securities acts, the Committee tended to over-
emphasize the potential effects of Model Act provisions on publicly held
corporations.... In a number of instances . . . Committee members
seemed to draw illustrations exclusively from publicly held corporations
even when the issues under discussion, such as conflict-of-interest trans-
actions between a director and the corporation, were more likely to arise,
or to pose more serious problems, in closely held corporations.
84. For example, the Reporter for the Committee on Corporate Laws, Professor
Jonathan R. Macey is prominent in the law and economics branch of academic
corporation law. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-specific Capi-
tal Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes,
1989 DUKE L.J. 173; Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract The New
Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984);
Jonathan R. Macey, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-
the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990); Jonathan R. Macey, State and
Federal Regulation of Corporate Takeovers: A View from the Demand Side, 69
WASH. U. L.Q. 383 (1991).
85. Just the work of Professors Fischel and (now judge) Easterbrook and the atten-
tion that work commanded illustrate law and economics' dominance. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics and
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pression. Law and economics posits that market forces in the product
market, in the market for managers, and in the so-called market for
corporate control police managerial conduct far more effectively than
laws and lawsuits ever could. In the latter market, if managers shirk
or engage in excessive self-dealing, the corporation's share price will
fall, eventually to a point at which players in the takeover game will
find the corporation an attractive target.8 6 Ex ante this possible scena-
rio is an effective deterrent, making managers refrain from shirking
and self-dealing.
The law and economics model is based upon the large, publicly
held corporation.8 7 For example, the market for corporate control
works only in a rough hewn manner and in corporations in which the
market for shares is relatively efficient. A great degree of corporate
misbehavior can occur before the market operates. 88 Further, the
market for corporate control or other market forces upon which law
and economics scholars premise their arguments work feebly or not at
Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Frank H. Eas-
terbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & ECON. 395 (1983);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1155 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271 (1986); Frank H. Eas-
terbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Lia-
bility and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA.
L. REV. 669 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982). See also Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the
Bottom" Revisited Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corpora-
tion Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Govern.
ance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982).
86. The seminal piece is Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
87. Even at that level, however, there still will be individual instances of shirking and
opportunistic behavior. The current outrage over excessive executive compensa-
tion is an illustration. See, e.g., GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCFSS--THE
OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTrVES (1991). See also BRYAN BUR-
ROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO
94-95 (1990)(excesses of RJR Nabisco Chief Executive F. Ross Johnson de-
scribed); Michael Allen, Posner Agrees to Formation of a Panel on Pay, Transac-
tions Within His Empire, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1987, at 5, col. 1 (excess of repeat
player Victor Posner described).
88. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute
Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 939 (1983)("[W]hile manag-
ers are always monitored by the market for corporate control ... that monitoring
still leaves them with a rather generous outer bound on the extraction of added
personal gain. Proxy contests and takeover bids are risky and expensive .... ").
See also Brudney, supra note 11, at 1421-23 (explaining theoretical and opera-
tional limits on workings of the market for managers).
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all in corporations with thinly traded share floats or insignificant pub-
lic share holdings. Along with closely held corporations, those are the
corporations that the Model Act regulates.8 9
D. Cutting the American Law Institute "Off at the Pass"
From the numbers of past and present members of the ABA Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws has been drawn an ad hoc committee
known as CORPRO. Ostensibly, the august business lawyers who
populate that committee are to represent the views of ABA Section of
Business Law members, acting as a liaison between those members
and the Reporters for the ALI Corporate Governance Project. Never
mind that they have never solicited any views, or any views that do
not agree with their own, from the ABA section membership. Fur-
ther, never mind that quite callously they have come to view their role
as political rather than scholarly.90
89. A thread runs from law and economics, laissez faire academic philosophy through
large law firm corporate lawyers to, in the end, law "reforms" such as the ABA
interested director transaction and derivative action proposals. For example,
prominent members of the law and economics fraternity find little distinction in
the division between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, that is, between
negligence and purposeful, venal behavior. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael
Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 290-92 (1986)(little
difference exists between corporate law duty of care and duty of loyalty and any
law reform proposal based upon the distinction is "highly suspect"); NICHOLAS
WoLFsoN, THE MODERN CORPORATION at 68 & 151 (1984)(empirical analysis of
corporate opportunity doctrine should reveal the "obvious possibility" that costs
outweigh the benefits of retaining corporate law duty of loyalty and that duty of
loyalty is "a weak basis.., on which to rest the legitimacy of the government" of
modern corporations). Cf. Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 776-78 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982)(comxon law has always made a "sharp
distinction" between breaches of trust and self dealing and other simpler
breaches of fiduciary duty and distinction "makes a great deal of sense, indeed, is
fundamental to... the preservation of state corporate law."). This erosion has
crept through to infect practitioner rhetoric about fiduciary duty. See, e.g., James
J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liabil-
ity Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1212 (1988)(footnote
omitted):
'"e phrase 'duty of loyalty' appears nowhere... in the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law or, so far as is known, anywhere else in the corpo-
ration statute of any other state .... Even Delaware lawyers concede
that the Delaware courts are unclear as to the parameters of the duty of
loyalty. The Delaware Supreme Court has had difficulty in distinguish-
ing the duty of care from the duty of loyalty.
See also Model Indemnification Statute Proposed for Corporate Directors, 19 Fed.
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 689 (May 8,1987)(duty of loyalty is a "vague term that
could lend itself to an expansive reading" and should be avoided)(remarks of
John Foley, Panel Chairman, National Association of Corporate Directors).
90. Another large scale political effort, to curtail the ALI Corporate Governance Pro-
ject, has been undertaken by the Business Roundtable, an organization comprised
of the Chief Executive Officers of the United States 100 largest corporations. See,
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Along the latter lines, CORPRO has taken upon itself recruitment
of "right thinking" lawyers to obtain membership in and attend an-
nual meetings of the American Law Institute. In 1990 and 1991 they
carried on active campaigns to get out the vote on the right.91 While
on the floor of the annual meeting, these right thinking members,
many of whom are general counsels to Fortune 500 corporations, sit in
blocks, whisper and caucus, and file mountains of motions to amend
the ALI Reporters' workproduct. This group of large firm corporate
lawyers and Fortune 500 general counsels have given a stately learned
society the flavor of a second rate state legislature. These CORPRO
members, or some of them, also act as a funnel from the ALI project
back to the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws. Indeed, substantial
overlap exists between the membership of the two groups.92
What has occurred is an ABA attempt to have in place and adopted
by a number of states an antidote to the ALI proposals on key issues.
If the ABA succeeds, the ALI suggestions will be a dead letter. Stat-
utes in place will provide exactly the opposite of what the ALI will
have attempted finally to codify at its 1992 annual meeting.93
e.g., Statement of the Business Roundtable on the American Law Institute Pro-
posed "Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Rec-
ommendation." (Feb. 1983).
91. See, e.g., Whitehill, The American Law Institute Tentatively Approves Part VI of
its Corporate Governance Project, in NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT IN
MID-PASSAGE: WHAT WILL IT MEAN TO You? 113, 114 (1991)("In 1990 CORPRO
made a major effort to improve attendance. The results were gratifying-more
than one hundred additional members voted on key issues.")(Mr. Whitehill iden-
tifies himself as General Counsel and Secretary, General Mills, Inc., and Chair-
man, Lawyers Steering Committee, Corporate Governance Task Force, The
Business Roundtable). See also Letter from Roswell Perkins, President, Ameri-
can Law Institute, to Members of the American Law Institute, entitled Ground
Rules for Discussion of Proposed Final Draft of Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance, 1 (Apr. 13,1992)(on file with the author)("A major campaign is underway to
assure high attendance on May 12 and May 13 by members who are corporate
practitioners.... [Ilt is important that this effort not result in an imbalance of
representation at the meeting. The ALI has been built on the premise that gen-
eralists, such as judges and general practitioners, and also practitioners and aca-
demics who may concentrate in other fields, are critical in formulating balanced
Institute positions."). Many corporate practitioners and house counsel attended
the 1992 meeting with instructions from corporate clients on how to vote, necessi-
tating a call by ALI President Perkins for any member who intended so to vote to
leave the room.
92. Compare 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. xxxv-xl (3rd ed. 1985)(roster of Commit-
tee on Corporate Laws membership 1979 to date) with American Bar Assoc., Sec-
tion of Business Law, Committee Directory 1989-1990 at 43 (current Committee
on Corporate Laws roster) & 107 (Ad Hoc Committee on ALI Corporate Govern-
ance Project roster)(1990)(13 of 20 CORPRO members current or former mem-
bers of the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws).
93. One example involves the timing of compliance with intracorporate procedures
in interested director transactions. In order to create an incentive to comply with
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There is great duplicity in this. Members of CORPRO repeatedly
object to ALI proposals as having no support in the case law.
Although the corporate governance project is not a restatement, these
corporate house counsel want the ALI to adhere closely to a restate-
ment type process. Constantly, they rise to object if the ALI black-
letter strays beyond codification of existing case law.94 By contrast, on
such procedures and to impart some aspirational content to their codification of
corporate law, the ALI Reporters provided that as a general matter corporate
officials must disclose and obtain a directorial vote in advance of the transaction.
See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS, § 5.02(a)(Tentative Draft No. 5, 1986). Cf. id. §§ 5.02(b) & 5.03 (after
the fact ratification sufficient in cases merely of defective disclosure and of ap-
proval of senior officials' compensation). This requirement of advance compli-
ance raised a furor on the floor of the ALI meeting. Corporate house counsel
wanted codification of provisions allowing after the fact ratification of all conflict
of interest transactions, even after suit had been filed by a shareholder. After
several years' debate, they did obtain the partial acquiescence of the ALI Report-
ers, in cases in which "the executive did not act unreasonably in failing to seek
advance authorization." Reporters' Memorandum to Members of the American
Law Institute, dated March 24, 1992, at 7 (proposing amendment of ALI § 5.02).
The ALI compromise had become necessary because, at an earlier date, the ABA
Committee on Corporate Laws had been happy to oblige. Hence, RMBCA
§ 8.61(b)(emphasis added) carefully specifies that safe harbor protection will be
obtained for conflict of interest transactions if "directors' action respecting the
transaction was at any time taken," permitting validation of conflict transaction
and ousting a court of subject matter jurisdiction even on the eve of trial. This is
but one example of the ABA Committee's "cut em off at the pass" mentality.
94. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, 67TH ANNUAL MEETING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE at 69 (no case law to support presumption of control at
less than 50% share ownership)(remarks of Charles Hansen)(1991); id. at 72 (no
support for "widely distributed" language in ALI § 6.02)(remarks of W. Loeber
Landau); id2 at 79-80 (law of no state requires supermajority vote to repeal provi-
sions adopted by supermajority vote)(remarks of Charles Hansen); id. at 88 (case
law does not support requirement that shareholders approve certain bylaw
changes)(remarks of Charles Hansen); icL at 98 (best interests of shareholders
rather than of corporation standard for takeover bids has no support in case
law)(remarks of Richard B. Smith); id at 103-04 (same)(remarks of Elliott Gold-
stein); i& at 110-11 (proposed ALI § 6.02(b) would eliminate large degree of dis-
cretion case law presently affords directors)(remarks of Professor Michael
Patrick Dooley); id- at 112 (same)(remarks of E. Norman Veasey); id. at 136-42
(ALI proposals criticized for lack of cognizance of state antitakeover stat-
utes)(remarks of Elliott Goldstein); id- at 155-56 ("materially disfavor" language
in ALI § 6.02 has no support in case law); i& at 196 (no case law or other support
for improper personal benefit limitation on indemnification of direc-
tors)(remarks of Charles Hansen). The same or a similar group of individuals
makes these objections at every American Law Institute discussion of corporate
governance while many of them simultaneously play a part in the ABA Commit-
tee on Corporate Laws' fashioning statutory proposals from whole cloth. See, e.g.,
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 65TH ANNUAL MEETING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERI-
CAN LAw INSTITUTE at 43 (remarks of Charles Hansen), at 77 (same), at 106-07
(remarks of Dennis J. Block), at 165-66 (remarks of Charles Hansen); at 174 (re-
marks of J. Kevin Ramsey), at 278 (remarks of Charles Hansen), at 312 (remarks
of J. Kevin Ramsey)(1989).
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the ABA side, these same individuals author fundamental changes in
corporate law such as universal demand, elimination of Zapata like
review, narrow technical definitions of conflict of interest transac-
tions, and nonreviewability of self-dealing that has no support in the
case law. Indeed, the ABA proposals so nullify judges' roles and are so
susceptible to sharp and unfair dealing that they never could conceiva-
bly find support in judge made law.
These ABA Committee on Corporate Laws and CORPRO mem-
bers are large law firm lawyers in whose lives the interests of large
publicly held corporate clients predominate. Most of those are Dela-
ware corporations. 95 Delaware corporate jurisprudence has a momen-
tum of its own. It will be affected little by what either the ALI or the
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws does. All in all, the process by
which the latest subchapters appear to have been added to the
RMBCA has been a short sighted exercise conducted by large firm
corporate lawyers who believe themselves and their clients to be the
sole judges of what is right and proper for the business sector in this
country.
III. CORPORATE LAW'S FUTURE: EVASION OF THE RMBCA
STRAIGHTJACKET
A. Judicial Avoidance
Much of the Committee on Corporate Laws' effort has been to re-
duce judges to mere automatons. For example, no matter how unfair
a judge suspects an interested director transaction to have been, the
RMBCA attempts to end the judge's inquiry if he finds that disinter-
ested directors have approved the transaction.96 So, too, with deriva-
tive actions, the RMBCA limits judges to a mechanical inspection of
the process leading to refusal of demand.97 Judges will chafe in these
roles.
1. Precedent for Judicial Avoidance
In some areas of corporate law, judges have resisted corporate bar
sponsored legislative attempts to neuter them. An area in which that
has occurred is the sale of a corporation's assets. Corporate lawyers
and managements have wanted freedom to sell substantial assets
without any requirement that shareholders approve. Despite numer-
ous attempts to box courts in through refinements of statutory limita-
tions on sales of assets, courts have continued to apply a common
sense qualitative test, rather than perform the mechanical quantita-
95. See, e.g., the statistics on Delaware incorporations by publicly held and large pub-
licly held firms, supra note 10.
96. RMBCA § 8.61, discussed supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
97. RMBCA § 7.44, discussed supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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tive exercise corporate lawyers preferred. Thus, even under "all or
substantially all" limitations on shareholder vote requirements, courts
have held that "the critical factor... is generally considered not the
amount of property sold but whether the sale is in fact an unusual
transaction."98
2. Anticipation of Judicial Nullification in ABA Commentary
The Committee on Corporate Laws has anticipated judicial nullifi-
cation. For example, with regard to its narrow, technical definition of
"director's conflicting interest transaction," in commentary the
RMBCA repeatedly provides that the definition is "exclusive" and an
interest of a director is a conflict "if and only if' it is within the pa-
rameters of the narrow, proposed statutory definition.9 9 The defini-
tions are to operate "preclusively... [denying] the power of the court
to act with respect to conflict of interest claims against directors...
that lie outside the statutory definition .... S"100
In the statute itself, section 8.61(a) forbids a court to ground reme-
dial action on any conflict of interest not within the narrow statutory
definition.01 As to transactions involving RMBCA bright line con-
flicts of interest, section 8.61(b) provides that
"A director's conflicting interest transaction may not be enjoined, set aside, or
give rise to an award of damages or other sanctions ... if:
(1) directors' action respecting the transaction was at any time taken...;
(2) shareholders' action respecting the transaction was at any time taken...;
(3) the transaction, judged according to the circumstances at the time of com-
mitment, is established to have been fair to the corporation.1 0 2
98. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. B.S.F. Co., 199 A.2d 557 (Del Ch. 1964), rev'd on other
grounds, 204 A.2d 746 (Del. 1964). Similarly, even after amendments to the stat-
utes, courts have held that the issue for them is whether the transaction is "a
significant step in a major change in the corporation's business." Campbell v.
Vose, 515 F.2d 256 (10th Cir. 1975). See also Gimbell v. Signal Companies, 316
A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974); Governing Bd. v. Pannill, 561 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. App.
1977).
99. Comment to RMBCA § 8.60, supra note 7, at 1315.
100. Id. at 1316. See also id. at 1320 (narrow definitions of related persons are "speci-
fied, exclusive, and preemptive.").
101. See RMBCA § 8.61(a), supra note 7, at 1321 (1989):
A transaction... that is not a director's conflicting interest transaction
may not be enjoined, set aside, or give rise to an award of damages or
other sanctions, in a proceeding by a shareholder or by or in the right of
the corporation, because a director of the corporation, or any person with
whom or which he has a personal, economic, or other association, has an
interest in the transaction.
See aZso Introductory Comment to RMBCA Subchapter F, id. at 1308 ("Circum-
stances that fall outside the statutory definition of conflicting interest cannot con-
stitute the basis for an attack on a transaction .... [To a greater degree than its
predecessors, the subchapter specifies when judicial intervention is appropriate
and when it is not.").
102. RMBCA § 8.61(b), supra note 7, at 1321. The taken "at any time" language has
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3. Grounds for Judicial Avoidance
Nothing in the RMBCA statute, as opposed to commentary, pre-
vents a court from making a Fliegler v. Lawrence finding: "nothing in
the statute sanctions unfairness to [the corporation]."103 If faced with
an outrageous or devious transaction directors have nonetheless ap-
proved, the court could find that the legislature could not have in-
tended such a result.104 Delaware's and other states' interested
director statutes purport to be absolute on their face, just as RMBCA
section 8.61(b) does. 1 05 That surface exclusivity has not prevented
courts from making the findings suggested, at least in extreme
cases.
106
B. Characterization of Wrongdoing as Affirmative Misconduct
Even Committee on Corporate Laws' members recognize that
some director transactions will be beyond the pale. Their commentary
gives the example of the loan by the corporation to a director at pre-
vailing commercial rates, but requiring "a commitment of limited
working capital that would otherwise have been used in furtherance
of the corporation's business activities. 107 Another example is the
use of scarce corporate funds "to purchase a sailing yacht owned by
one of its directors."108 Overall, the ABA commentary states that "a
director's affirmative misconduct goes well beyond a claim that he has
a conflicting interest, and judicial action against such improper behav-
ior remains available."
A difficulty is that common law has never made a distinction be-
tween affirmative misconduct and other duty of loyalty violations.1o9
been inserted to countenance both after the fact ratification as well as advance
scrutiny, in part to nullify the ALI effort to impart some aspirational content to
interested director statutes. See supra note 93.
103. 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976).
104. "To construe statutes so as to avoid absurd or unjust results [is] a traditional func-
tion of the courts." Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). See also United
States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)(same). See generally
CALBRESI, supra note 40, at 34-43 (1982); Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some
Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, text accompanying
n.41-50 (1947). On the state level, see, e.g., Haberman v. WPPSS, 744 P.2d 1032,
1052 (Wash. 1987)(legislature could not have intended unfair result under state
securities law); Adams v. American W. Sec., Inc., 510 P.2d 838, 845 (Or. 1975)(leg-
islature could not have intended "absurd result").
105. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991) with RMBCA § 8.61(b), supra note
42.
106. The same scenario could play out in cases in which apparently independent and
diligent directors have recommended dismissal of derivative litigation that to any
impartial observer should proceed to trial.
107. Comment to RMBCA § 8.61(b), supra note 7, at 1324.
108. Id. at 1325.
109. At common law a director simply was to serve the corporation's best interests. If
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Plaintiffs then might view the phrase "affirmative misconduct" as an
empty vessel into which much can be poured.
The Model Act commentary views as affirmative misconduct at-
tempted directorial use of corporate machinery to funnel transactions
to the director's advantage.
In respect of day-to-day business dealings, the main practical risk of impropri-
ety would be that a director having a conflicting interest might seek to exert
inappropriate influence upon the interior operations of the enterprise, [or]
might try to use his status as a director to pressure lower level employees to
divert their business out of ordinary channels to his advantage.11 0
No great leap is required, then, to say the RMBCA sanitization proce-
dure encompasses only those cases in which the director passively lays
before the corporation a proposed transaction with himself. If the di-
rector has participated in fashioning the terms on the corporation's
behalf, or seeing to it that the proposed transaction came to the corpo-
ration in the first place, affirmative misconduct is present, not pro-
tected by board approval or fairness of terms. A putative plaintiff
should examine closely not only the transaction's terms but the pro-
cess whereby it came to consummation. 111 By their very terms or na-
ture, too, certain transactions, such as the loan of scarce corporate
funds or the purchase of the director's yacht, will emit a strong infer-
ence of "affirmative misconduct" and are outside of Model Act Chap-
ter 8, Subchapter F.
C. Use of Expanded Versions of the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
RMBCA subchapter comments provide clearly that the "sub-
chapter by its terms" does not apply to cases of usurpation of corpo-
rate opportunities.31 2 Yet the terrain that the corporate opportunity
doctrine encompasses has expanded greatly in recent years. Thus, a
means whereby the purported sanitizing effect of directorial approval
or the narrow technical definition of conflicts of interest may be
avoided is to use expanded notions of corporate opportunity to end run
RMBCA Subchapter F.
he was found not to have done so, through either active or passive means, he
could be held liable, either for any damage to the corporation or for any illicit
gain. Accord Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corpo-
rations, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1675, 1676-88 (1990)(historical focus of fiduciary duty
has been failure to serve the corporation's best interests rather than the narrower
band of "affirmative bad faith or intentional misconduct by the fiduciary.").
110. Comment to R!MBCA § 8.60, supra note 7, at 1319.
111. One is again reminded of Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483,
121 N.E. 378, 380 (1918)(Cardozo, J.), in which the interested director negotiated
with a subordinate in the corporation, exerting "an influence... dominating per-
haps, and surely potent and persuasive... from beginning to end." That type
conduct, which rises above merely laying a proposal at the corporation's doorstep,
arguably is affirmative misconduct.
112. Introductory Comment to Subchapter F, supra note 7, at 1311-12.
1993]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
One broadened test has been called an "expectations test" of a cor-
porate opportunity.1 1 3 At the core of the expectations test is one of
the oldest of all definitions. If a director transaction "balks the corpo-
ration" in achievement of one of its purposes, 14 the director has
usurped a corporate opportunity. Thus, if a contract with a director,
or with an entity related to him, causes the corporation to fall short of
an articulated goal, the interested director transaction also constitutes
usurpation of a corporate opportunity.
For example, if a corporation has a choice of manufacturing a com-
ponent part in house, or of purchasing from external sources, the com-
ponent is purchased from a director's company, and the corporation is
never able to develop its product due to fault in supply of the compo-
nent, the interested director transaction has balked the corporation in
achievement of one of its purposes. The definition of corporate oppor-
tunity also could extend to transactions in which directorial dealings
cause the corporation to fall short of subsidiary but overriding goals
such as efficiency or profitability.115
Another core definition of corporate opportunity is use of corpo-
rate resources, including information. 116 No matter how disparate
from a corporation's business, a business opportunity is a corporate
opportunity if a director used corporate resources to discover or de-
velop it.117 If, then, a director has utilized corporate physical facilities,
travel at corporate expense, marketing or feasibility studies, corporate
communications facilities, or corporate personnel to lay the ground-
work for what later becomes an interested director transaction, she
has usurped a corporate opportunity.'ls Since the conduct consists of
113. See generally Pat K. Chew, Competing Interests in the Corporate Opportunity
Doctrine, 67 N.C. L. REV. 435 (1989).
114. The quoted language comes from a largely neglected branch of a case usually
cited as leading authority for a narrow, old fashioned definition of corporate op-
portunity, Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 28 So. 199 (Ala. 1900).
115. See, e.g., Comedy Cottage, Inc. v. Berk, 495 N.E.2d 1006, 1011 (Ill. App. 1986)(a test
of corporate opportunity is whether the director transaction "would hinder or
defeat plans and purposes of the corporation in carrying on or developing legiti-
mate business for which it was created," citing Paulman v. Kritzer, 74 Ill. App.2d
284, 219 N.E.2d 541 (1966), affd 38 Ill.2d 101, 230 N.E.2d 262 (1967); Northwestern
Terra Cotta Corp. v. Wilson, 74 Ill. App.2d 38, 219 N.E.2d 860 (1966)).
116. Indeed, in part this branch of the doctrine is at the core of the grandfather of all
corporate opportunity cases. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 512 (Del. 1939) (use
by corporate executive of position and corporate facilities to develop Pepsi-Cola
bottling contract on his own behalf).
117. See, e.g., In re Trim-Lean Meat Products, Inc., 4 B.R. 243, 247 (Del. 1980): "[A]
business opportunity falling outside a corporation's line of business and which
could not otherwise be considered a corporate opportunity, nevertheless, will be
deemed a corporate opportunity if developed or financed with corporate funds."
118. The rationale of this branch of the doctrine is that the corporate opportunity is
the opportunity of using its own resources to develop opportunities and contracts
on its behalf. See, e.g., id. The director who has used resources to develop the
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usurpation of a corporate opportunity, any attempted directorial sani-
tization pursuant to the RMBCA would protect neither the conduct
nor the usurping director.119
D. Attacks Within the Statutory Framework-Faults in the Process of
Disinterested Director Approval
A plaintiff could attack the process leading to approval of an inter-
ested director transaction or refusal of a derivative action demand on
three possible bases. The first is that the disclosure given the directors
was inadequate; the second is that "disinterested directors" were not
truly disinterested, and the third is that in acting the directors did not
exercise the requisite amount of care.
1. Disclosure Defects
Incredibly, the ABA committee provides a roadmap to excuse
other than full disclosure. Their statute permits a director to excuse
lack of disclosure on the basis of a new concept known as "extrinsic
duty of confidentiality."1 20 Thus, "[i]f a director has a conflicting in-
terest respecting a transaction... and if the director has a duty under
law or professional canon, or a duty of confidentiality to another per-
son.., then disclosure is sufficient for purposes of [director approval]
if the director... discloses to the directors voting on the transaction
the existence and nature of his conflicting interest and informs them
transaction on behalf of himself is subject to having a constructive trust placed
upon all fruits of the endeavor. See, e.g., Banks v. Bryant, 497 So.2d 460, 461-63
(Ala. 1986). In Banks, a group of directors of a corporation operating a greyhound
racing track in Greene County, Alabama obtained for themselves a contract to
manage a new dog track in Macon County, Alabama. The Alabama Supreme
Court's dispositive finding was that these directors had "utilized some of the
property belonging to the corporation in their acquisition of the Macon County
management contract. This property included architectural plans, confidential
marketing studies, the physical facilities, and an airplane, as well as employees of
Greenetrack, their expertise and training programs." In answer to the defense
that the new track had expressly refused to deal with Greenetrack, the court
found that "[i]rrespective of the Macon group's statement that they did not want
to do business with the Greene Group, it was in fact the facilities, assets, and
expertise of the Greene Group that they were calling on for aid." The court up-
held imposition of a constructive trust on all benefits flowing from the directors'
contract to develop the second track.
119. Moreover, as with the balking the corporation in achievement of its purposes test,
the use of corporate resources test of corporate opportunity is not a recent addi-
tion to expanded notions of what are corporate opportunities. It is bedrock com-
mon law. See supra note 93, at § 5.05(b)("[A] corporate opportunity means...
any opportunity to engage in business activity of which a director or senior exec-
utive becomes aware ... through the use of corporate information or property
.... ")(emphasis added) and Reporter's Note 3 thereto (collecting cases).
120. See RMBCA § 8.62(b) and Comment thereto, supra note 7, at 1328-29.
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of the character and limitations imposed by that duty .... 121 The
justifications in commentary are improbable ones such as "grand jury
seal" or "national security" reasons or "lawyers' or doctors' privilege."
"The most frequent use.. ., however, will undoubtedly be in connec-
tion with common directors [of contracting corporations] who find
themselves in a position of dual fiduciary obligations that clash."'2 2
Of course, in an earlier day, morality only perhaps slightly higher
than that trodden by the workaday crowd would have dictated that,
unable to make full disclosure, a director either cause the related en-
tity to forgo the transaction, or eliminate the conflict by resigning
from one position or the other.123 This external duty of confidential-
ity exception to the rule of full disclosure is unprecedented at common
law, cut from whole cloth by the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws.
Worse yet, the exception is so capable of manipulation by devious di-
rectors as to be obvious even to the untrained eye.124
2. Lack of Due Care
The ABA committee's commentary to their statute does admit of
attacks on the action, or lack thereof, by the other, disinterested
directors.
[A] condition-an obvious one-is that the board's action must comply with
the care, best interests, and good faith criteria prescribed... for all directors'
actions. If the directors who voted... were qualified [disinterested] directors
under subchapter F, but approved the transaction merely as an accommoda-
tion to the director with the conflicting interest.., the action of the board
would not be given effect for purposes of the [subchapter] .... 125
In such a situation, equally culpable as real wrongdoers are the direc-
tors who failed to be diligent or merely went through the motions.
Although under a modern scheme of corporate law including the
121. RMBCA § 8.62(b).
122. Comment to RMBCA § 8.62(b), supra note 7, at 1329.
123. The language is a paraphrase of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249
N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928):
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting
at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.... Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior.... Uncompromising rigidity has been the atti-
tude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undi-
vided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions.
Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level
higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be low-
ered by any judgement of this court.
124. Some manipulation would be necessary because the exception to full disclosure
cannot be invoked if the director or a related party is a direct participant in the
transaction. See RMBCA § 8.62(b). However, the possibilities for use of straw
men and dummy corporations to evade full disclosure require only small amounts
of imagination.
125. Comment to § 8.61(b), supra note 7, at 1323.
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Model Act, if a plaintiff were to attempt to hold those directors liable
for damage the transaction had done to the corporation, that plaintiff
might well find that the corporation had opted out of liability for duty
of care violations.
3. Duty of Loyalty Attacks
At bottom, then, a plaintiff's most fruitful line of endeavor might
be a close examination of the disinterest of the disinterested directors,
a duty of loyalty attack on those other than the alleged wrongdoer.
The difficulties here are also numerous. They include lack of any
right to discovery to flesh out any strong suspicions a plaintiff might
have, the ubiquitous use of newly created directors as the committee
who approves the transaction or rejects the demand, the very narrow
statutory limitation of disabling conflict to direct pecuniary interests
alone, and the sheer messiness of it all.
If a plaintiff chooses to attack the other directors, she may well be
attacking reputable business persons. 2 6 She must be alleging that the
other directors have a pecuniary relationship to the proposed transac-
tion or an entity participating in it or, more likely, that the directors
were dominated by or beholden to the dominant, interested director or
controlling shareholder. That is a difficult row to hoe because, under-
standably, courts are loathe to find an apparently reputable individual
not to have been his own person. The whole process is likely to be
distasteful, first for a plaintiff who must sling some mud, and, second,
for a judge who must accept it.127
Such allegations also can rarely be made unless plaintiff has some
opportunity for discovery. Discovery, however, is impossible unless a
plaintiff has a complaint on file. In derivative actions, even after fil-
ing, courts place severe restrictions on discovery.1 28
126. Recall that the paradigm for Model Act jurisdictions is not a Fortune 500 corpora-
tion in which directors who appear to reputable are indeed so. The proper para-
digm is quasi-public corporation in a smaller town or city in which shadows and
shades of gray rather than clear disinterest is likely to be the norm. See supra
notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
127. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815-16 (1985), demonstrates this judicial reluc-
tance to find directors lacking in independence. Cf. Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton
Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 52-52 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981)(lack
of independence found); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 966-67 (Del. Ch. 1985) (ma-
terial issue of fact raised as to independence of single director litigation
committee).
128. Under the Delaware scheme, in demand refused or demand excused cases, plain-
tiff is entitled to no discovery. See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914 (Del. Ch.
1987), aff'd 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988). After a refusal of demand, and the filing of a
complaint, a plaintiff still can have no discovery. She must first have adjudicated
her claim of wrongfulness in refusal of the demand. Indeed, prior to such an
adjudication, Delaware courts have issued protective orders for corporate defend-
ants, preventing any attempt at discovery. See, e.g., Levine v. Smith, Fed. Sec. L.
1993]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:258
However, under an RMBCA scheme of universal demand, a plain-
tiff cannot get a complaint on file until she has made demand and
waited ninety days.'2 9 During that time, intelligent directors will un-
dertake their own in house discovery, with ample opportunity to put
spin on it. The result of that discovery will be "demand refused."
E. Proceeding in a Direct Rather Than Derivative Action
In the past, mainly to avoid security for expenses statutes to dis-
courage "strike suits," plaintiff shareholders attempted to characterize
their claim as direct rather than derivative. In the future, plaintiffs
will seek to do so as a means of avoiding sanitizing procedures such as
Model Act Subchapter F, or universal demand requirements, special
litigation committees of directors, and inevitable "demand refused"
outcomes. To maintain control of the litigation, plaintiffs will seek to
proceed in actions styled as direct rather than by or in the right of the
corporation, that is, derivative.130
Historically, plaintiffs have demonstrated great creativity. Courts
have also viewed such efforts receptively. Recently, the Supreme
Court of Delaware reiterated its stand that, if in the area of overlap a
claim can be cast as direct or derivative, the court will exercise great
flexibility, ordinarily upholding the plaintiff's characterization of her
case.
13 1
Rep. (CCH) 93,581 (Del. Ch. 1987); Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp.
1106 (D. Del. 1985); Lewis v. Hilton, 648 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Other courts are more reasonable, permitting limited discovery after the com-
plaint has been filed but before a hearing has been held on allegations that de-
mand has been wrongfully refused or is excused. See, e.g., De Moya v. Fernandez,
559 So.2d 644, 645 (Fla. App. 1990)("[T]he objections raised [to an SLC report]
were sufficient to require... an evidentiary hearing with respect to the disputed
issues of bias, conflict of interest, objectivity and reasonableness in the prepara-
tion and presentation of the report."); Rosen v. Bernhard, 485 N.Y.S.2d 791, 792
(A.D. 1985)(similar); Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 328 (N.C. 1987)(plaintiff
shareholders should be permitted an opportunity "to develop and present evi-
dence."). See also supra note 69, at § 7.11(a)(limited discovery for plaintiffs
authorized).
129. RMBCA § 7.42(2). Even after 90 days have elapsed and a complaint has been
filed, RMBCA § 7.43 provides that: "[i]f the corporation commences an inquiry
into the allegations made ... the court may stay any derivative proceeding for
such period as the court deems appropriate."
130. The downside, and the reason more suits have not been brought as direct actions
in the recent past, is that unless the suit produces a common fund or a statute
such as a state Blue Sky law providing for attorney's fees is successfully invoked,
no attorney's fees will be available in direct actions. The plaintiffs, possibly act-
ing as a shareholder class, will have to pay the attorney. In derivative actions,
fees for plaintiff's attorneys are awarded if a substantial, but not necessarily mon-
etary benefit, is produced for the corporation. See, e.g., authorities cited in note 28
supra.
131. See Lipton v. News Int'l, PLC, 514 A.2d 1075, 1079-80 (Del. 1986). To the same
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In the past, characterizations that stretched a bit were nonetheless
upheld. For example, in Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,132 plain-
tiff objected to an airline corporation's reorganization into a holding
company. Defendants claimed that any injury occasioned by the hold-
ing company formation was to the corporation and, therefore, the ac-
tion should be derivative. Plaintiff avoided posting bond by the
argument that holding company formation and his conversion into a
holding company shareholder would deprive him of a vote that could
directly affect airline operations. So viewed, the injury was to him as a
shareholder and to his voting right. His characterization of the action
as direct rather than derivative was upheld.133
Suits to enjoin ultra vires acts or to enforce specific articles of in-
corporation are always direct. Actions challenging diluting issuances
of shares to shift control, or to perpetuate control of the corporation,
are also personal.1 34 Suits by minority shareholders against majority
shareholders tend to be treated as direct.135 Suits to enforce rights to
inspect corporate records, to obtain preemptive rights, to compel dec-
laration of dividends, to dissolve the corporation involuntarily, or
against a fiduciary for fraud in share transactions directly with a
shareholder are all direct.136
The cases tend to be fact specific. Courts usually offer the observa-
tion that if the injury alleged is to the corporation and only indirectly
to the shareholder the action is derivative. Conversely, if the injury is
to the shareholder the action is direct. In somewhat more helpful
fashion, the Supreme Court of Delaware has stated: "The distinction
between derivative and individual actions rests upon the party being
directly injured by the alleged wrongdoing.... For a plaintiff to have
standing to bring an individual action, he must be injured directly or
independently of the corporation."137
effect is PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS, § 7.01(c)(Tenative Draft No. 8)(1988).
132. 451 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1971) (Kaufman, J.).
133. Similarly, in Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co., 173 A.2d 319 (Pa.
1961), the corporation's largest shareholder had voted in favor of a motion ap-
proving repurchase of his shares by the corporation. Such a transaction would
deplete the corporate treasury, damaging the corporation and making the action
derivative. Plaintiff, however, was able successfully to argue that the self-dealing
shareholder's vote had diluted other shareholders' voting power, emphasizing in-
jury to plaintiff shareholder rather than to the corporation.
134. See, e.g., Lockheed v. Alacano, 697 F. Supp. 406 (D. Utah 1988)(suit to protest
stock option issuance held direct because dilution of ownership involved).
135. But see Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d
464 (1969)(Traynor, J.)(resolution of the issue depends upon whether injury al-
leged is to the corporation or to minority shareholders)
136. See generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 662-64 (1986); WILLIAM L.
CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 892-99
(5th ed. 1980); supra note 131, Reporter's Note I to § 7.01, at 29.
137. Kramer v. Western Pac. Indus., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988).
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However, while courts speak in terms of injury and of "special in-
jury," most frequently they permit a direct action when plaintiff has
alleged denial of a right associated with shareholding. Courts speak in
terms of common law tort concepts of injury but act along lines resem-
bling the civil law concept of denial of rights. The rights denied can
find their genesis in law or contract, express or implied, including con-
tracts implied by law as well as by acts of the parties. Direct actions
most frequently involve denial of rights associated with shareholding
such as a voting right, a right to information and disclosure, a right to
be free of dilution, and so on, even though the plaintiff has alleged no
"special injury."1 3 8
Last of all, by proceeding directly, the plaintiff may not necessarily
lose a principal benefit of proceeding in a derivative action, the award
of attorney's fees from the corporate treasury.
[W]here the shareholder's individual interests are directly and equally impli-
cated, as in proxy contests, the distinction between individual and representa-
tive claims may become blurred. Indeed, the same wrong may give rise to
both an individual and derivative action.
The standard which governs the allowance of counsel fees .. is a flexible
one based on the historic power of the Court of Chancery to do equity in par-
ticular situations. If... the shareholder commences an individual action with
consequential benefit for all other members of a class, or for the corporation
itself, there is no justification for denying recourse to a fee shifting standard
which has evolved for the therapeutic purpose of rewarding individual effort
which flows to a class.... [Tihere is no class action or derivative suit prereq-
uisite to an award of attorneys'fees under the common benefit exception. 13 9
IV. CONCLUSION
Discussion of the manner in which a shareholder can get to court
with a bona fide dispute, or obtain judicial review of the attempt at
intracorporate resolution of that dispute, should not be necessary.
That is doubly true under what should be a middle of the road Ameri-
can Bar Association "model" enactment. Such a discussion has be-
come necessary, however, because mindful of the "plight" of some of
their Fortune 500 clients, at times beset with rashes of lawsuits, or
merely because they are playing cat and mouse games with the ALI
Corporate Governance Project, the large law firm lawyers that domi-
nate the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws have been unmindful of
their proper role. They have forgotten the noncommercial states and
the small and quasi-public firms that the ABA Model Act has tradi-
138. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 806 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1986)(claim that plaintiff,
through fraud, had been denied the controlling shareholder's ordinary right to
positions on the board of directors and lack of disclosure claim treated as di-
rect)(Missouri law).
139. Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1166 (Del. 1989)(citations omit-
ted)(emphasis added).
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tionally governed. They have forgotten any consideration of where
the broader public interest might lie.
An old lawyer maxim states that when a lawyer-any lawyer-en-
gages in law reform work-in their town, in their home state, or on a
national level, as with the ALI or the ABA Committee on Corporate
Laws-the lawyer so engaged leaves her client at the door. Demon-
strating an astonishing shortsightedness, ABA Committee on Corpo-
rate Laws members have failed to heed that maxim. As they have
worked on the statute, especially on the later additions to it dealing
with conflicts of interest and derivative actions, they have carried cli-
ent interests, and those interests alone, into the conference room.
What they have rendered and its effect on corporations, on capital for-
mation, and on moral hazards for corporate fiduciaries across this
country could be profound, felt well into the twenty first century. It is
difficult to conjure up a more complete abandonment of the public
interest than that of the American Bar Association Committee on
Corporate Laws in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
